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The Effects of Airline Alliances 
Introduction  
Over approximately the past decade, cooperation and mergers have become major trends 
in the airlines industry.  Cooperation between airlines takes place through such arrangements as 
alliances and codeshare agreements.  The three major airline alliances are Star Alliance, Sky 
Team, and Oneworld.  These alliances currently represent more than 70% of international airline 
traffic and include both large and small airlines (IATA).  These cooperative arrangements and 
mergers could lead to benefits for the involved airlines through lower production costs from 
economies of scale and consolidation of facilities as well as increased flight traffic, routes, and 
market share. Codeshare agreements in alliances also allow airlines to sell tickets for flights 
operated by other airlines, thus theoretically increasing airline revenue.  With codesharing 
agreements, airlines can also combine connecting flights to form new flight itineraries. With 
airline alliances, passengers can also enjoy an increase in departures and destinations, lower 
fares, and shorter travel and layover times through more effective coordination of connecting 
flights.   
However, there is concern that cooperation can also lead to higher fares through 
decreased competition.  With fewer distinct airlines in a market, prices may be increased because 
the decrease in competition reduces the downward pressure on prices.  This paper will study the 
effects of airline alliances on the economic welfare of passengers and airlines by studying how 
membership in an airline alliance affects ticket price, revenue passenger miles, and available seat 
utilization.  Revenue passenger miles represent the number of paying passengers aboard the 
flight multiplied by the distance traveled in air miles and available seat utilization represents the 
proportion of available seats filled by paying passengers.   
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Background 
 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 halted the US government’s control over fares, 
routes, and market entry in the airlines industry.  This act paved the way for a more liberal, 
deregulated airlines industry in the US.  As a result, airlines began taking more control over their 
operations and a few trends began to emerge.  The 1980’s brought hub-and-spoke networks as 
well as frequent flier programs.  Through a hub-and-spoke system, airlines can offer more 
departures to additional destinations through a well-coordinated hub system.  Figure 1 shows 
how a flight from point A can reach point B through the hub, H.  In the late 1990’s, a new trend 
of airline alliances was developing.  Airlines began to work together in mutually beneficial 
agreements.  The Star Alliance was formed in 1997 with the Oneworld alliance following in 
1999 and the Sky Team alliance in 2000.  These three alliances combine to represent more than 
70% of the international scheduled traffic (IATA).  The main purpose of these alliances is to 
reduce costs by integrating certain activities, such as promotion and purchase of fuel as well as 
linking the airlines’ networks while avoiding large capital expenditures, such as new aircraft and 
hubs.  Allied airlines also split the revenue from interline flights.  Figure 1 explains how an 
airline operating route AB can combine with an airline operating route DE.  Passengers can now 
fly from point A to point E by passing through the hubs H and K.  These alliance agreements are 
especially useful when done internationally because it saves the member airlines from having to 
build additional hubs abroad (Brueckner 2001). 
Allied airlines also reap the benefits of better coordination of connecting flights through 
codesharing, a major part of these alliances.  Through codesharing, different airlines can sell 
tickets for the same flight.  The operating carrier runs the flight, while the marketing carrier can 
sell space on it through various arrangements, such as a block sale.  By listing flights carried by 
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another airline, airlines can extend their networks of service, reduce their marketing costs, and 
increase their demand.  Codesharing also helps with connections and layovers because two 
connecting flights from different airlines can be billed as the same route.   
In addition to this trend of alliances, the airlines industry has also experienced major 
mergers in the past decade.  This past summer, British Airways merged with Iberia Air.  In 
March of 2005, Lufthansa, the flagship airline of Germany, acquired Swiss Air, the national 
airline of Switzerland.  In September of 2003, France’s national airlines, Air France, and the 
Netherland’s KLM Royal Dutch Airlines merged.  In 2001, Japan Airlines merged with Japan 
Air systems and in 2000 Air Canada acquired Canadian Airlines.  In the US domestic market, 
large recent mergers include Continental’s merger with United in 2010, Southwest’s acquisition 
of  AirTran in 2010, and Delta’s Acquisition of  Northwest in 2008.  Looking forward to the near 
future, Jet Blue is rumored to be looking for a merger and Ryanair has historically tried to take 
over Aer Lingus.  The main point of these mergers is to take advantage of synergies and 
economies of scale, gain market share, and increase flight routes.    
Alliances and mergers also help airlines bypass the bilateral or multilateral air transport 
agreements needed to operate international flights between two countries.  An example of a 
bilateral agreement is the EU-US Open Skies Agreement in effect since 2008 that allows any US 
airline to fly into EU and vice versa.  By forming alliances, airlines can gain flight access into 
foreign markets through codesharing agreements with an airline currently involved in a bilateral 
or multilateral agreement with the target country of destination (Brueckner 2001). 
Finally, these alliances and mergers between major airlines have spurred antitrust concerns.  If 
two major airlines merge or enter an alliance, competition could be reduced.  Reduced 
competition could lead to lower quality of service, higher prices, higher barriers to entry, and 
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even predatory pricing to harm competitors.  Mergers and alliances could give airlines a 
monopoly in certain markets, especially in surrounding areas of a major hub airport.  However, 
in a time when members of airline alliances account for 70% of the market, mergers and 
alliances between major airlines might be the only way to remain competitive in the industry.  In 
addition, it is important to understand how an airline alliance affects customers as well as the 
airlines themselves.  To measure these effects, this paper will focus on how membership in an 
alliance affects ticket prices, revenue passenger miles, and available seat utilization.  This paper 
will attempt to determine if membership in an alliance lowers ticket prices, a favorable outcome 
for customers, and increases revenue passenger miles and available seat utilization, which are 
favorable outcomes for airlines. 
Literature Review 
 Because airlines play such a large role in the transportation industry, much has been said 
about mergers and alliances between airlines.  Many researchers have studied the benefits of 
airline mergers, alliances, and codesharing agreements.  Most of these studies focus on price, 
competition, demand, and passenger traffic.  The question of whether alliances or full mergers 
are more beneficial has also been explored.  However, the variables and data used in this paper 
will bring an updated look at the effects of airline alliances, a question that has not been explored 
heavily since the late 1990’s and early 2000’s when airline alliances were a relatively new 
concept in the airline industry. 
Jan K. Brueckner, a professor of economics at The University of California, Irvine, has 
carried out a substantial amount of research into airline alliances and mergers.  He has concluded 
that airline alliances might lead to higher fares and lower traffic between airline hubs on a single 
airline due to decreased competition, but lower fares and higher traffic on city-pairs that utilize 
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flights from both airlines.  The interline fares charged are determined to be 25% lower than the 
fares charged by non-alliance airlines (Brueckner 2003).  Brueckner also determines that 
codesharing between international airlines reduces fares on international interline flights by 8-
17%.  He finds these results through a multiple regression using airfare as the dependent variable 
with independent variables including flight distance, the average of the endpoint city’s 
populations, regional, codeshare, alliance, and anti-trust dummies, as well as market competition 
variables (Brueckner 2003).  It would seem that airline alliances therefore are beneficial for 
passengers.  However, in a paper published in conjunction with Eric Pels, Brueckner determines 
that in European airline mergers involving joining of alliances, such as Air France and KLM’s 
merger, the airlines benefit from higher profits, while consumers are harmed by the 
anticompetitive effects of the consolidation.  These types of mergers that include the merging of 
alliances lead to lower traffic and higher fares in all city-pair markets because of the reduction of 
competition involved.  A reduction of competition allows airlines to raise prices and fees 
(Brueckner and Pels).   
Volodymyr Bilotkach has also delved into the study of codesharing and agrees with 
Brueckner on some points, but refutes his findings in other areas.  Similar to Brueckner, 
Bilotkach  determines that codesharing agreements decreases interline fares by up to 22.5% and 
alliance membership decreases fares by up to 10%.  He uses a multiple regression based on 
variables such as distance, economy seats, country of flight origin, alliance, antitrust immunity, 
number of competitors on route, and market size.  However, unlike Brueckner,  Bilotkach 
contends that antitrust immunity is not a major source of  increased fares on nonstop routes 
between allied airline’s hubs (Bilotkach). 
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Waleed Youssef and Mark Hansen study the consequences of alliances between 
international airlines, with a case focus on Swiss Air and SAS.  The alliance is evaluated based 
on quality, market concentration, and fares.  Since the alliance’s inception, the number of flights 
between the airlines’ hubs increased and the layover time between connected flights decreased.  
However, fares for direct flights between the airlines’ hubs increased due to drastically reduced 
competition along this route.  The paper also determined that competition between the hubs of 
the member alliances is eliminated.  The benefits to intra-alliance passengers on connecting 
flights arrive at the expense of intra-alliance direct flight passengers (Youssef and Hansen). 
Jong Hun Park’s study shows how airline alliances are beneficial when market demand is high, 
but decrease consumer welfare when market demand is low and economies of density are high.  
In addition, parallel alliances between airlines operating the same routes pre-alliance lead to 
lower consumer welfare, while complementary alliances between airlines operating different 
routes, lead to higher consumer welfare (Park 1997).   
 Finally, Philippe Barla and Christos Constantatos have explored the decision between 
undertaking a full merger or strategic alliance between airlines.  Using a model market composed 
of three competitors, or a Cournot triopoly, they determine that a two-firm merger is successful 
in raising prices, but decreases the profits of the two firms in the merger.  This decrease in profits 
is not as substantial under an alliance because the allied firms still compete with one another.  
However, Barla and Constantatos contend that the cooperating airlines in a strategic alliance will 
still make less profit than if they remained separate, unless large synergies and cost reductions 
are achieved.  Barla and Constantatos do not consider the effects of synergies in their research 
and suggest that there may be cases where a full merger could lead to an increase in profits.  
Either way, a strategic alliance is preferable to a full merger overall (Barla and Constantatos). 
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Research Question 
 There is no deficiency of literature involving consolidation and alliances in the airlines 
industry.  However, the research into airline alliances has slowed down in recent years.  Many of 
these studies focus on different effects from an airline alliance, such as fares, competition, and 
quality of service.  Some studies are case based, some are based on a hypothetical model, and 
some take into account a large range of statistical data.  Some studies focus on domestic airlines, 
while others focus on international airline agreements, but there has not been much significant 
work involving airline alliances in recent years.  In addition, no study has focused on airfares, 
revenue passenger miles, and available seat utilization as measures of the effects of airline 
alliances. 
Since international airlines are not required to report to the US Department of 
Transportation, I will be focusing on domestic airlines and how membership in alliances affects 
such variables as airfare and the amount of revenue passenger miles and available seats utilized 
per flight on both domestic and international trips.  I have decided to limit the research to airline 
alliances rather than include mergers because many post-merger companies submit financial 
reports as one entity and do not separate reports between the merged companies.  It would be 
interesting as well to compare the effects of alliances between domestic and foreign airlines, 
specifically flagship carriers, but this international data is not readily available.  Since the data in 
this report involves solely domestic airlines, I expect that membership in alliances will be more 
favorable to airlines than consumers by yielding both higher fares and higher utilization of 
available seats.  The decreased competition among these domestic and international routes will 
allow airlines to raise prices, while codesharing will allow allied airlines to have higher revenue 
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passenger miles and increased available seat utilization.  The following section will explain the 
methodology behind this study. 
Methodology and Data 
 My methodology for this research will consist mostly of a multiple regression analysis.  I 
will be analyzing the data reported by the Research and Innovative Technology Administration 
(RITA) and more specifically from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  The three reports I 
will be focusing on are the DB1BTicket Report, the T-100 International Segment Report, and the 
T1: US Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service Class.   
The DB1BTicket Report is part of the airline Origin and Destination Survey, which is a 
10% sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers.  The table contains summary 
characteristics of the reported flights, including the reporting carrier, itinerary fare, number of 
passengers, roundtrip indicator, and miles flown.  I used the data from the third quarter of 2009 
in order to analyze the most recent, complete data during a peak travel season.  The 8 million 
reported flights were narrowed down to 1.5 million by removing flights that were not round trip, 
included more than 5 coupons, or included less than 3 coupons.  Itineraries with less than 3 
coupons were deleted as a means of focusing on trips with at least one connecting flight.  
Itineraries with more than 5 coupons were deleted because these complex itineraries are likely to 
have more than one destination with connecting flights part of a longer itinerary.  The itinerary 
fare was set as the dependent variable and the independent variables were set as passengers, 
distance, miles flown, and number of coupons.  The passenger variable designates the number of 
passengers on the flight, the distance variable includes the full distance traveled including ground 
transportation, the miles flown variable states the number of miles flown from the origin to the 
destination, and the coupons variable designates the number of coupons in the itinerary, which 
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corresponds to the number of itinerary segments or connecting flights involved. Dummy 
variables were set for routes that included more than a single carrier (codesharing) and airlines 
that are part of one of the three major global alliances.  The Single Carrier variable equals 1 if no 
codeshare agreement is present and the Alliance variable equals 1 if the airline is part of an 
alliance.  The Model Summary, ANOVA, and Correlation tables for this dataset are reported in 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 249.458 1.844  135.313 .000 
SINGLE_CARRIER -21.746 .504 -.040 -43.186 .000 
Distance .070 .002 .439 36.818 .000 
MilesFlown -.031 .002 -.198 -16.561 .000 
ALLIANCE 27.800 .538 .047 51.713 .000 
Coupons 7.566 .459 .014 16.479 .000 
Passengers -24.529 .257 -.078 -95.480 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: ItinFare 
 
According to the correlation coefficient in Exhibit 1, over 73% of the variability in the 
airfare can be determined by this regression equation at a significance level of 0.000, meaning 
this regression is a good fit.  In addition, all variables have significance levels less than 0.05, 
making all of them statistically significant.  According to the output, an increase in the distance 
traveled and the number of coupon segments raises prices, which is a logical outcome because 
longer flights should cost more money.  However, an increase in passengers decreases ticket 
prices, perhaps due to the ability to spread costs over more customers.  The data also supports the 
hypothesis that codeshare agreements and alliances lead to increased airfares.  The Single Carrier 
output coefficient of -21.746 means a lack of codesharing lowers the ticket price by that amount.  
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The presence of an alliance also raises ticket prices by the coefficient of 27.8.  The Pearson 
Correlation output in Exhibit 1 further solidifies the statistically significant correlation between 
these variables.  On these routes flown by US carriers, alliances and codeshare agreements allow 
airlines to raise prices, suggesting that airline alliances are not beneficial to consumers.  
However, since international data is not readily available, this conclusion can only be applied to 
US carriers. 
My analysis of this research questions continues with the T-100 International Segment 
Report provided by the US Department of Transportation.  This report contains non-stop 
segment data reported by US carriers with at least one part of the flight in the US.  This data set 
complements the previous one because it includes domestic carriers, but looks at both 
international and domestic flights as well as strictly non-stop flights.  The data set includes 
origin, destination, passengers, seats, ramp to ramp time, air time, distance between airports and 
departures performed.  I added in a dummy variable to denote membership in an alliance as well 
as a utilization variable to represent the utilization of available seats.  Utilization is determined 
by the number of passengers on the flight divided by the number of available seats.  I narrowed 
down the data to approximately 19,500 flights by focusing on flights in 2009 with over 50 
passengers and routes that were flown over ten times in the year.  I analyzed the data using a 
linear regression model with utilization as the dependent variable and independent variables 
including: departures performed, number of seats, number of passengers, distance between 
airports, and air time.   I used dummy variables to designate if the airline is in an alliance, if the 
flight is international, and the flight region.  The Model Summary, ANOVA, and Correlation 
tables for this dataset are reported in Exhibit 2, with the coefficient output table reported below 
for convenient reference: 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .692 .002  360.531 .000 
ALLIANCE .011 .002 .031 6.707 .000 
Atlantic -.017 .002 -.048 -7.294 .000 
Pacific -.045 .003 -.083 -14.461 .000 
AIR_TIME -4.247E-6 .000 -.214 -18.064 .000 
International -.002 .006 -.002 -.387 .699 
DISTANCE 2.103E-5 .000 .268 25.162 .000 
PASSENGER .000 .000 2.984 169.707 .000 
SEATS -9.903E-5 .000 -2.614 -140.207 .000 
DEPARTURES_PERFORM
ED 
.000 .000 .062 9.799 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: UTILIZATION 
 
According to the correlation coefficient in Exhibit 2, over 64% of the variability in seat 
utilization can be determined by the regression model constructed above at a significance level of 
0.000, meaning this regression is statistically significant with moderate correlation.  In addition, 
all variables have significance levels less than 0.05, meaning each variable is significant, 
including the dummy variable for membership in an alliance.  The Pearson Correlation also 
reports significance levels of less than 0.05 for all variable interactions, making their correlations 
statistically significant as well.  The alliance variable has a positive coefficient of 0.011, meaning 
alliance membership is positively tied to an increase in the utilization of available seats.  This 
result is to be expected, since airlines would not enter alliances if it did not benefit them in some 
way.  Though the coefficient of 0.011 seems small, it is more significant in the context of the 
small intercept of 0.692.  The codeshare agreements that are part of alliances also allow multiple 
airlines to sell seats on a given flight, making it more likely that more seats will be filled.  A 
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wider network through which tickets can be sold should logically result in increased sales and 
greater seat utilization.  Passengers, seats, and departures performed have coefficients of zero, 
meaning they have no additional effect on seat utilization other than their magnitude.  This is to 
be expected because passengers and seats are the two components of seat utilization and the 
departures performed variable designates the number of departures of the specific flight itinerary 
in 2009.  The output of the regional and international dummy variables is interesting with all but 
the Pacific region having positive effects on utilization.  The main conclusion from this data 
however is that membership in an alliance appears to have a positive relationship with seat 
utilization.   These results support the hypothesis that airline alliances benefit member airlines, 
keeping in mind the data is from domestic airline reports. 
 The final data set regarded in this study will be the T1: Us Air Carrier Traffic and 
Capacity Summary by Service Class reported by the US Department of Transportation.  This 
report contains air traffic data reported by US carriers in both domestic and international 
markets.  I used the 2009 data in order to have the most recent fully complete data.  This table is 
useful in this analysis because it includes available seat miles, revenue passenger miles, revenue 
air hours, revenue miles flown, and revenue departures performed.  The initial pool of flights was 
narrowed down to nearly 6,000 flights.  These flights were chosen on the basis that there were at 
least 100 available seat miles and route departures were performed at least once per month.  
Freight tons were not considered and freight-only flights were removed from the data in order to 
focus specifically on passenger flights.  I also included useful dummy variables to complete the 
analysis.  These dummy variables include one to determine whether or not the airline is part of 
an alliance as well as multiple regional dummy variables.  The regional dummy variables 
determine whether the flight is operated in the Pacific region, Atlantic region, or Latin America.  
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It is important to take flight regions into account as certain regions might have an effect on 
airline traffic.  I will be focusing on revenue passenger miles with this data instead of a 
utilization variable to determine how being in an alliance affects the amount of passengers on a 
flight.  A regression with the revenue passenger miles as the dependent variable is the most 
appropriate way to investigate the affects of these different variables.  The independent variables 
used include revenue aircraft hours airborne, revenue aircraft miles flown, revenue aircraft 
departures performed, and available seat miles.  The dummy variables include the regional 
variables, a variable to determine if the airline is in an alliance, and a variable to determine if the 
flight is international or not.  This dataset complements the other two because it includes both 
international and domestic flights, but covers the entire 2009 year to give a wider view of these 
flight routes.  The Model Summary, ANOVA, and Correlation tables for this dataset are reported 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3153194.395 1247228.168  2.528 .011 
Atlantic -6.186E7 5049688.971 -.013 -12.250 .000 
Pacific -3.597E7 4945252.754 -.007 -7.275 .000 
International -3.189E7 4697389.977 -.006 -6.788 .000 
Alliance 1.260E7 2352793.021 .006 5.356 .000 
REV_ACRFT_HRS_AIRBO
RNE_610 
-12623.043 2382.448 -.238 -5.298 .000 
REV_ACRFT_MILES_FLO
WN_410 
43.473 4.840 .353 8.982 .000 
REV_ACRFT_DEP_PERF_
510 
-5459.954 865.835 -.059 -6.306 .000 
AVL_SEAT_MILES_320 .757 .006 .928 135.676 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: REV_PAX_MILES_140 
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According to the correlation coefficient reported in Exhibit 3, over 99% of the variability 
in revenue passenger miles can be explained by the regression equation using the included 
variables.  In addition to this high correlation, the significance level of less than 0.000 means this 
regression equation is statistically significant.  In addition, all variables have significance levels 
less than 0.05, meaning each variable is statistically significant, including the dummy variable 
for membership in an alliance.  The Pearson Correlation also reports significance levels of less 
than 0.05 for all variable interactions, making their correlations statistically significant as well.  
The alliance dummy variable has a positive coefficient of 1.260E7, meaning membership in an 
alliance is positively tied to revenue passenger miles.  This result is logical because membership 
in an alliance helps the airline through codesharing, joint frequent flier programs, and other 
promotional benefits, which would lead to increased passenger miles.  As has been stated above, 
codesharing exposes flights to a larger market of consumers and should therefore lead to more 
passengers.  In addition, 34% of the variability in revenue passenger miles is directly explained 
by whether or not the carrier airline is in an alliance.  The positive coefficients of available seat 
miles flown and revenue passenger miles flown is to be expected because revenue passenger 
miles are part of available seat miles and the longer the distance of the flight, the more 
passengers that are likely to be on it.  A shuttle flight between two closely proximate cities is 
likely to have fewer passengers than a flight with a longer distance because shuttle flights can 
operate more frequently and will have a higher demand, but also have to compete with 
alternative train and bus routes.  This same idea also explains why the departures performed 
variable has a negative relationship with revenue passenger miles, since smaller shuttle flights 
will have more departures, even as frequently as every hour.  Both regional dummy variables are 
negative, meaning both Atlantic and Pacific flights have negative effects on revenue passenger 
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miles, while Latin American flights have a positive effect.  The main conclusion from this data is 
that membership in an alliance appears to have a positive relationship with revenue passenger 
miles, again supporting the hypothesis that airline alliances benefit member airlines.  This dataset 
in conjunction with the two previously analyzed datasets can lead to interesting conclusions 
about memberships in airline alliances. 
Conclusion 
 There have been many essays published on airline alliances, but this issue has not been 
visited in quite some time.  In addition, no study has evaluated the effects of airline alliances on 
both consumers and airlines by focusing on ticket fares, available seat utilization, and revenue 
passenger miles.  The overall conclusion from this data is that membership in an airline alliance 
benefits the airlines more than the consumers.  While airlines can enjoy higher revenue, 
passenger miles flown, and available seat utilization from being in an alliance, consumers are 
adversely affected from the higher fares alliances seem to establish.  Using the output from the 
DB1B ticket report, both the general alliances and more specifically, codesharing, have 
statistically significant positive effects on airfares.  This dataset is important because it includes 
trips with up to at least 3 route segments, highlighting specifically the effects of codesharing in 
an alliance.  The results of the T-100 International Segment dataset suggest that there is a 
statistically significant positive relationship between alliance membership and available seat 
utilization, or the proportion of available seats filled by revenue paying passengers.  The results 
from the T1: Us Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service Class dataset corroborate 
these results by concluding that there is a positive relationship between membership in an 
alliance and revenue passenger miles flown.   
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 The concluding results of this study might differ from the general results of other, more 
expansive studies published about airline alliances, but this study’s results are in line with other 
studies involving domestic airlines and similar datasets.  As discussed in the literary review, 
Brueckner and Bilotkach agree that alliances lead to lower airfares in general, but their data 
consisted of more international flights from datasets that are not readily available to the public.  
In addition, Brueckner agrees that alliances lead to larger airfares in certain domestic routes, 
including routes that involve an airline’s major hub (Brueckner 2003).  Waleed Youssef and 
Mark Hansen reported similar findings involving an increase in airfares in hub to hub routes 
(Youssef and Hansen).  Since the routes examined in this paper are domestic, these results reflect 
those of Brueckner, Youssef, and Hansen.  Finally, Jong Hun Park’s study shows how airline 
alliances are beneficial when market demand is high, but decrease consumer welfare when 
market demand is low (Park 1998).  The advent of video conferencing as well as the recent 
economic downturn have adversely affected demand in the airlines industry and could be a factor 
in why the results in this paper suggest that airline alliances negatively affect consumers.   
 The results in this paper suggest that more antitrust investigations should be taking place 
regarding airline alliances and mergers.  In 2001, the US Department of Justice announced it 
would block the proposed merger between US Airways and United Airlines.  The concerns were 
that the two airways would create a monopoly in the Washington D.C. and Philadelphia markets.  
The US Department of Justice also concluded that the merger would have lessened competition 
in the transatlantic markets.  Less competition could lead to an increase in fares and a negative 
impact on general consumer welfare (McDonald).  The research in this paper echoes the US 
Department of Justice’s concerns and suggests that more investigations should be made into 
airline alliances.  Other investigations could be made to determine how alliances affect the 
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amount of airline alliances and the length of layover times.  An increase in departures and a 
decrease in layover times due to alliances would make passengers more likely to book through 
alliances in the future. 
 Since the data in this research study concerns solely domestic carriers on domestic and 
international routes, no conclusions can be made regarding the affects of airline alliances on 
foreign carriers or flight routes with both origins and destinations in foreign countries.  However, 
this study remains significant as not much research has been done into airline alliances in recent 
years.  According to the data in this paper, airline alliances lead to higher fares on domestic 
routes as well as greater passenger revenue miles and available seat utilization.   
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Exhibit 1: DB1B Ticket Report 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .073 .073 246.29206 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.677E9 6 1.113E9 18345.891 .000
a
 
Residual 8.451E10 1393205 60659.781   
Total 9.119E10 1393211    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Passengers, Distance, ALLIANCE, Coupons, SINGLE_CARRIER, MilesFlown 
b. Dependent Variable: ItinFare 
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Exhibit 2: T-100 International Segment Report 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .641 .640 .08743 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DEPARTURES_PERFORMED, International, 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 264.409 9 29.379 3843.344 .000
a
 
Residual 148.325 19404 .008   
Total 412.734 19413    
a. Predictors: (Constant), DEPARTURES_PERFORMED, International, Pacific, Atlantic, 
ALLIANCE, PASSENGER, DISTANCE, AIR_TIME, SEATS 
b. Dependent Variable: UTILIZATION 
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Exhibit 3: T1: Us Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service Class 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .995 .995 7.156E7 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AVL_SEAT_MILES_320, Pacific, International, Atlantic, Alliance, 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.244E21 8 7.805E20 152416.776 .000
a
 
Residual 3.014E19 5887 5.121E15   
Total 6.274E21 5895    
a. Predictors: (Constant), AVL_SEAT_MILES_320, Pacific, International, Atlantic, Alliance, REV_ACRFT_DEP_PERF_510, 
REV_ACRFT_MILES_FLOWN_410, REV_ACRFT_HRS_AIRBORNE_610 
b. Dependent Variable: REV_PAX_MILES_140 
 
 
